Relevant Market Definition: When non-substitute products constitute a single and broader market

Natalia Acevedo A. Abogada, Universidad de Chile. Diplomada en Regulación y Competencia (Facultad de Economía y Negocios), y en Derecho y Política de la Competencia (Facultad de Derecho), Universidad de Chile. Máster en Derecho, Universidad de Columbia, EE.UU. (W. Bayard Cutting Jr. Fellow y Public Interest Honoree). Becaria Fulbright. Relatora del Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia. Docente del Diplomado de Libre Competencia de la Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez.

Abstract: Last December, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice released the New Merger Guidelines, underscoring the reliance on demand-side substitution arguments to define relevant markets.

Despite this, the Guidelines also incorporate potential supply responses into the market share calculations stage, albeit posing practical challenges. In addition, the Guidelines outline three market settings – cluster, bundle, and one-stop shopping markets – where relevant market definitions shall include non-substitutable products and differentiate each from the overarching concept of “cluster markets” often cited by courts.

This research aims to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating non-substitutable products into a broader relevant market, and endeavors to ascertain convergence between judicial interpretations, to foster alignment with the stance advocated by the Agencies.

«(…) the Guidelines specify three specific settings in wherein multiple non-substitutable products may be allocated within a broader relevant market using only demand-side reasoning: (i) cluster markets; (ii) bundle markets; and (iii) one-stop shopping markets. Through these three settings, the Guidelines seek to separate what the courts have most of the times just called “cluster markets” by distinguishing the features that make each category different from the other.»