Antitrust and democracy | CeCo
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Competencia y democracia

Antitrust and democracy

27.01.2021
Daniel A. Crane
Daniel A. Crane Frederick Paul Furth, Sr., Professor of Law, University of Michigan.

Aunque hay un amplio consenso entre académicos de que existe un vínculo necesario entre derecho antimonopolios y democracia, hay menos acuerdo en dilucidar cuáles son esos vínculos, y cómo debieran tenerse en cuenta en las decisiones reales del derecho de competencia. En este ensayo, el autor profundiza en lo que él considera seis puntos de contacto de la relación entre derecho antimonopolios y democracia: antimonopolios como una justificación de la economía orientada por el mercado; antimonopolios como una forma de prevenir la corrosión de la democracia; las visiones políticas como un insumo de la aplicación del derecho antimonopolios; organismos antimonopolios como objetos del escrutinio democrático; el rol de los jueces; y los ciudadanos votando guiados por las cosas que ven y sienten.

Although there is broad consensus among scholars that there is a necessary linkage between antitrust and democracy, there is less agreement figuring out what all of the linkages are, and how they should factor into actual competition law decisions. In this essay, the author delves into what he regards as six touchpoints concerning the relationship between antitrust law and democracy: antitrust as justifying a market-oriented economy; antitrust as preventing corrosion of democracy; political sentiment as input into antitrust enforcement; antitrust enforcers as democratically accountable; the role of the judiciary; and citizens voting with their eyeballs.

«Both the Chilean and U.S. systems raise important questions about the institutional relationship between democracy and antitrust. If curtailing monopoly is critical to sustaining democracy, then shouldn’t the constitutionally ordained chief executive of the democracy take responsibility for enforcement decisions? Or, on the contrary, do democratic rule of law values require separating enforcement decisions from direct political control in order to prevent corruption or undue influence?«

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