Rewards in Competition Law: Complementary Tool or Rival to Compliance and Leniency?

Abstract: The introduction of monetary rewards as a mechanism to encourage informants to provide competition authorities with relevant information about anticompetitive practices presents certain design challenges. These are addressed in this paper, which engages with the existing academic literature and the comparative review of existing rewards programs in the few countries that have already adopted one, such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Slovakia, Hungary, and Peru. In particular, we analyze the relationship of complementarity and reinforcement that reward programs have with respect to leniency programs, according to the definition of the objective and subjective scopes of application. Likewise, we study the relationship of complementarity and competition that may arise between applying to a competition authority’s rewards program and the internal reporting of illegal practices that is implemented as part of a company’s competition law compliance program.

«Reward programs complement and reinforce leniency programs. Essentially, rewards aim to increase the number of people who collaborate with competition authorities in detecting the most harmful anticompetitive practices»

DESCARGAR INVESTIGACIÓN DOWNLOAD RESEARCH DESCARGAR INVESTIGACIÓN