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On 18 July, Apple announced significant changes to its iOS ecosystem in Brazil following the approval of a cease-and-desist agreement with the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE). Under the agreement, Apple committed to allowing alternative app stores, expanding developers’ access to third-party payment systems, and relaxing restrictions on how developers communicate alternative purchasing options to users.
At first glance, these commitments resemble measures already adopted (or at least debated) in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the Brazilian settlement is significant not only because of the obligations it imposes on Apple, but because it reflects a broader transformation in the country’s approach to competition enforcement in digital markets, one that is becoming increasingly willing to intervene while simultaneously advancing broader institutional reforms, with implications that extend well into the geopolitical arena.
Over the past decade, digital platforms have become a central focus of competition authorities worldwide. As concerns over the market power of large technology companies have intensified, regulators have increasingly questioned the competitive implications of closed digital ecosystems, self-preferencing practices, restrictions on interoperability, and barriers limiting users’ and businesses’ ability to switch between services. Within this broader debate, mobile operating systems and app stores have emerged as particularly important areas of enforcement. Their role as gatekeepers between developers and consumers has prompted growing scrutiny of the rules governing app distribution, payment systems and access to digital ecosystems.
Apple’s App Store has been at the centre of many of these debates. Over the past few years, the company has faced investigations and litigations in several jurisdictions regarding its control over app distribution, the mandatory use of its in-app payment system, and restrictions preventing developers from informing users about alternative purchasing options outside Apple’s ecosystem.
The most prominent dispute arose in the United States following Epic Games’ lawsuit in 2021. The litigation began after Apple removed Fortnite from the App Store when Epic attempted to implement its own payment system, bypassing Apple’s in-app purchase mechanism and its commission (typically up to 30%) on digital transactions. Although Apple prevailed on most claims, courts required the company to allow developers to direct users to alternative payment methods. Subsequent litigation focused on Apple’s implementation of that injunction, particularly its decision to impose a 27% commission on purchases completed through external payment systems after users were redirected from an app. In 2025, the courts concluded that these measures failed to comply with the original injunction, further limiting Apple’s anti-steering practices. Apple is currently appealing to the Supreme Court.
In parallel, Apple came under scrutiny in the European Union. Following complaints lodged by Spotify and providers of e-books and audiobooks, the European Commission investigated whether Apple’s App Store rules unfairly restricted competition by requiring developers to use Apple’s proprietary in-app purchase system and preventing them from informing users about cheaper purchasing options outside their apps. The Commission ultimately imposed a fine on Apple in 2024, while many of the competition concerns identified in those investigations were later addressed more broadly through the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which established ex ante obligations for designated gatekeepers, including requirements relating to app distribution, steering and interoperability.
It was within this broader international landscape that Brazil launched its own investigation. CADE’s inquiry into Apple’s App Store began in 2022 following complaints filed by Ebazar.com.br and Mercado Pago concerning potential anticompetitive conduct related, in particular, to the alleged abuse of dominant position in the distribution of apps and digital services. In late 2024, the preliminary investigation was converted into a formal administrative proceeding.
According to CADE’s General Superintendence (Superintendência-Geral, or SG), the authority’s investigative body, the alleged conduct involved anti-steering practices. Apple’s rules allegedly prevented third-party developers from offering their digital products or services outside the App Store and restricted the use of alternative channels through which users of Apple devices could access different purchasing options. In its technical assessment, the SG considered that such conduct could potentially constitute violations of Brazilian competition law, including: (i) tying practices, due to the alleged mandatory use of the App Store and Apple’s payment system; (ii) discriminatory practices among economic agents, by allegedly providing unequal treatment and advantages to companies offering physical goods rather than digital services; and (iii) potential access to commercially sensitive information from competitors.
Therefore, alongside the formal administrative proceeding, the SG imposed an interim measure requiring Apple to allow developers and iOS users to freely choose app distribution channels and payment processing systems. The measure was later upheld by CADE’s Tribunal on 16 May 2025. Although the decision was temporarily suspended by the judiciary, it was subsequently reinstated following an appeal by CADE.
The case became notable not only because of the examination of Apple’s conduct, but also because of the institutional practices adopted throughout the proceedings. In February 2025, CADE held its first-ever public hearing dedicated to ongoing investigations involving specific companies. The hearing, entitled “Mobile Device Digital Ecosystems (iOS and Android),” formed part of the investigations concerning Apple and Google’s mobile operating systems. Thirty organizations submitted applications to participate in the hearing, of which sixteen were selected, including representatives from industry, academia, and civil society. CADE subsequently published a report summarising the contributions received during the hearing in December 2025.
Meanwhile, following the conclusion of its investigation, the SG recommended in June 2025 the conviction of the iPhone maker for anticompetitive conduct and referred the case to CADE’s Tribunal for a final decision. Apple continued to dispute both the existence of a dominant position and the alleged competitive effects of its practices. Before the Tribunal’s judgment, however, the company submitted (in July 2025) a proposal for a cease-and-desist agreement (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação, or «TCC» in Portuguese).
After a period of negotiation, Apple’s settlement proposal was approved by CADE’s Tribunal in December 2025. The agreement stipulates that Apple must enable the distribution of iOS applications in Brazil through alternative app stores. It also requires Apple to allow developers distributing apps to offer alternative payment service providers (PSPs) for transactions involving digital products and services within their apps, provided that developers also offer Apple’s In-App Purchase (IAP) system alongside such alternatives. Furthermore, Apple must allow developers to promote external offers available on their websites through static text for steering purposes and/or active links within their apps, provided that, whenever active links are made available to users, Apple’s IAP system is also offered alongside them. Earlier this year, after motions for clarification (embargos de declaração), the Tribunal also clarified that developers’ freedom to advertise and market third-party digital goods and services within their apps constitutes a binding element underlying the approval of the TCC.
It is important to note that the agreement appears to apply exclusively to iOS and makes no mention of iPadOS, except for a provision requiring Apple to «free of charge, allow the restoration (via iOS and/or iPadOS backups to iCloud or a computer) of the download of apps previously acquired through an alternative app store.» That said, the practical interpretation of this scope will ultimately depend on CADE’s monitoring of compliance with the agreement.
More recently, Apple proposed an amendment to the TCC concerning promotional activities directed at individuals under 18, in light of the recently enacted Brazilian Digital Child and Adolescent Statute (“ECA Digital”), which entered into force after the TCC’s approval. Upon reviewing Apple’s request, the SG raised no objections, considering that the proposed adjustment was consistent with the objectives of the statute. Still, in the course of reassessing the agreement, the SG itself proposed a more significant modification: the removal of the requirement to appoint a Monitoring Trustee.
According to the SG, although the original TCC provided for the appointment of a Monitoring Trustee, such a mechanism would not be necessary or appropriate, given that the obligations established in the agreement are behavioral, standardized, and self-executing. The SG also raised concerns that routing third-party complaints through a trustee could create risks of capture, principal-agent problems, information asymmetries, and potentially prevent CADE from becoming aware of possible breaches. Based on these considerations, it proposed an amendment to remove the Monitoring Trustee requirement and assume direct responsibility for monitoring compliance with the TCC.
Following the issuance of the SG’s opinion, an official request for comments was sent to the ANPD (the Brazilian Data Protection Authority, which also oversees aspects related to the ECA Digital) regarding the proposed amendments. The ANPD subsequently issued its opinion, with no concerns, concluding that while the requested modifications are not strictly necessary to comply with the ECA Digital, they are compatible with the law and reflect higher standards of protection for children and adolescents. The Tribunal’s final decision on the proposed adjustments to the TCC, however, remains pending.
Meanwhile, Epic Games alleged that Apple had limited its compliance with the TCC to iOS (excluding iPadOS), made the installation of third-party app stores unnecessarily burdensome, and required users to share excessive amounts of data with Apple, among other issues. ONSIDE.IO B.V. raised similar concerns. These submissions prompted CADE to notify Apple and invite the company to respond to these allegations.
The Apple’s App Store case takes place amid a broader transformation in Brazil’s approach to competition enforcement in digital markets. Until recently, Brazil’s antitrust framework was often perceived as adopting a more cautious stance toward digital platforms, particularly regarding the adoption of remedies specifically tailored to address the challenges posed by digital markets. In 2024, I co-authored an article with Renzetti examining the absence of digital remedies imposed by CADE, arguing that the authority’s enforcement practice at the time reflected a relatively restrained approach to intervention in digital markets. Since then, however, a series of developments have significantly reshaped this landscape.
Over the past two years, Brazil has substantially intensified its debate on digital platform competition and regulation. A series of public consultations were launched, while the Ministry of Finance coordinated technical studies and stakeholder dialogues aimed at supporting legislative reform. CADE actively contributed to this process by participating in public hearings. These efforts culminated in Bill No. 4,675/2025 (PL 4675/2025), introduced by the Executive Branch and inspired by international benchmarks. The bill seeks to amend the Brazilian Competition Law by establishing a designation regime for systemically relevant digital platforms, empowering CADE to impose ex ante obligations on designated firms, and creating a dedicated institutional framework within the authority to supervise those platforms. Recently, the bill’s rapporteur presented a revised version that preserved its core architecture, with a few adjustments.
At the enforcement level, CADE has likewise adopted a considerably more proactive role in anticipation of a potential regulatory framework for digital platforms. Since 2024, the authority has initiated proceedings not only against Apple, but also against Google and Meta, while expanding opportunities for public participation in digital competition debates. At the same time, it has intensified its advocacy efforts by publishing studies and technical reports. CADE’s current President has also publicly expressed support for the legislative discussions surrounding Bill No. 4,675/2025.
Despite the support from the executive branch and other political actors, these initiatives have also faced significant domestic resistance. Several legal practitioners, business associations, and industry advocacy organizations have criticized both the proposed regulatory framework and CADE’s increasingly interventionist approach. Conversely, public institutions, civil society organizations, and a small group of academics have welcomed these developments as important steps toward addressing competition concerns in digital markets.
But if, domestically, such initiatives still face significant criticism, this increasingly proactive approach has certainly also not gone unnoticed abroad. As the first country in Latin America to pursue an ambitious legislative agenda for digital platforms, Brazil has recently paired this with a more assertive antitrust enforcement stance, one that poses a direct challenge to Big Tech dominance. Therefore, even a consensual resolution in the Apple’s App Store case in Brazil can be viewed as a “loss”, with ripple effects extending well beyond the case itself into the broader geopolitical arena.
In this sense, following Apple’s cease-and-desist agreement, representatives of Epic Games have accused the company of attempting to interfere with the Brazilian regulatory process. Media reports also indicate that other U.S. companies have intensified their lobbying efforts against Bill No. 4,675/2025, elevating the debate to diplomatic implications. The U.S. Embassy had previously engaged in discussions concerning the initiative, and more recently, Republican lawmakers urged the administration to raise concerns with the Brazilian government regarding the bill. The controversy has become intertwined with broader Brazil–United States tensions, which culminated in the U.S. administration’s decision to impose a 25% tariff on a broad range of Brazilian exports under Section 301 in late July.
While the merits of these claims remain contested, they highlight how Brazil’s enforcement actions have become entangled in a broader international dispute over digital platform regulation. Consequently, the outcome of the Apple’s App Store case is likely to extend far beyond developer freedom or app store fees, carrying unfolding ramifications for national sovereignty, economic policy, and the governance of global technology companies.
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